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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The writer became very interested in this study for many 
reasons. He is fond of linguistics and comparative linguis­
tics in particular. His training in the Arabic and English 
languages has always made him wonder about commonalities 
among languages. Cross-cultural comparisons are difficult 
when they involve nonmaterial traits. The difficulty lies in 
the medium through which such comparisons are available. In 
this case the medium is language. 
Introduced to the semantic differential technique during 
the spring and summer of 1976, the writer helped in an un­
published study employing the technique with philosophical 
concepts. The semantic differential technique offers a 
scientific means by which the affective domain may be ex­
plored. This technique has already established its repu­
tation among psychologists and social scientists. Its pro­
ponents claim that all linguistic groups share at least three 
dominant underlying factors, namely: evaluative, activity, 
and potency. Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) stated that 
the evaluative dimension seems to be most closely associated 
to attitude measurement. Although many language comparisons 
using the semantic differential technique manipulate single-
object stimuli (such as mother, boy, sea, etc.), phrases and 
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complete sentences may also be used. 
Research has been conducted to evaluate and/or identify 
one's philosophical orientation; but no reported research 
on philosophical attitude assessment has employed the 
semantic differential technique. Only one study to date has 
used any type of philosophical instrument across cultures. 
This study was reported by Naser (1966). 
The instrument, which was administered on 200 American 
students in 1976 at the Iowa State University campus, yielded 
encouraging results. The writer thought it was important to 
extend the instrument and translate it to include Arabic and 
Persian as well as English. Unfortunately, the Iranian 
students did not show enough interest in the study and 
consequently Persian was eliminated. The final purpose, then, 
was to use two languages as comparisons and contrasts for the 
Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis. Basically, this hypothesis postu­
lates that language is a prerequisite to thinking. 
Significance of the Problem 
There are many hypotheses about human nature that require 
cross-cultural and linguistic designs so that what is common 
to the human species and what is culturally specific can be 
differentiated. Cross-cultural studies, in general, end up 
serving both the researcher and the people searched (Osgood, 
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May, and Miron, 1975). Indeed, cross-cultural studies are 
essential as means of overcoming the cultural and linguistic 
barriers among nations which may lead to isolation and 
hostility. 
Studying the philosophical orientations of other culture 
groups is one way of studying the pattern of thinking 
exercised by those groups. However, thinking also incorpo­
rates the influence of social and cultural variables. Such 
variables affect the general thinking-pattern in a culture. 
Assessing the philosophical inclination or orientation of a 
group is,in fact, measuring these variables as well. This 
research was designed to serve the above needs, i.e., to 
develop a reliable approach to such assessments and, then, to 
assess certain philosophical attitudes. 
Objectives 
The objectives of this study were: (1) to develop a 
short, efficient bilingual semantic differential instrument, 
utilizing qualifiers (adjectival pairs) from the evaluative 
dimension of semantic space to measure philosophical atti­
tudes; (2) to assess the factor structure and the reliability 
of the instrument; and (3) to use the instrument in comparing 
the philosophical orientations of Arab and American students 
in higher education. As a sub-part of number 3 above, a 
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comparison of American and Arab students, the following null 
hypotheses were tested: 
(a) Hypothesis: There are no significant differences 
between American and Arab students in their orienta­
tions toward Idealism. 
(b) Hypothesis: There are no significant differences 
between American and Arab students in their orienta­
tions toward Existentialism. 
(c) Hypothesis: There are no significant differences 
between American and Arab students in their orienta­
tions toward Realism. 
(d) Hypothesis: There are no significant differences 
between American and Arab students in their orienta­
tions toward Pragmatism. 
Assumptions 
The following assumptions have been incorporated into 
this study. First of all, philosophy is an integrated part 
of any culture. As stated previously, it is also a product of 
thinking, and its major manifestation is apparent in social 
beliefs and conduct. The most reliable means of its 
identification is language. 
Secondly, it is possible to identify one's philosophical 
beliefs through language. American students are assumed to 
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be familiar with theoretical concepts from the various common 
philosophical camps. Arab students who are pursuing higher 
education in the United States of America are also assumed 
to have a fair knowledge of major philosophical schools, 
since philosophy is a course required for graduation from 
high school and college in Arabic countries. 
Thirdly, it seems reasonable to assume that the evalua­
tive dimension of semantic space is the most appropriate one 
to use in measuring philosophical attitudes. 
Definition of Terms 
The terms for the purpose of this study are defined in 
the following manner: 
(1) Arabs. Semites living in the countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa. The languages spoken in that 
area of the world are regional dialects derived from the 
standard Arabic language as reported in the Koran (Moslems' 
Holy Book). 
(2) Culture. Sum total of modes and thinking and 
behavior which can be inherited and transmitted through 
symbols, especially language (Tylor, 1889). 
(3) Existentialism. The theory in modern philosophy 
that man has no fixed nature, and that he shapes his being 
by the choices he makes as he lives; both Protestants and 
Catholics as well as secularists have participated in its 
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development (Good, 1973). 
(4) Idealism. A system of thought which emphasizes mind 
or spiritual reality as a preeminent principle of explana­
tion. It concludes that the universe is an expression of in­
telligence and will, that the enduring substance of the world 
is of the nature of mind, and that the material is explained 
by the mental (Good, 1973). 
(5) Pragmatism. The theory in modern philosophy that the 
meaning of any intellectual conception can be ascertained 
through considering "what practical consequences might con­
ceivably result from necessity from the truth of that con­
ception; and the sum of these consequences which constitute 
the entire meaning of the conception* (Good, 1973). 
(6) Realism, modern. The doctrine which states that the 
object of knowledge is distinct and exists independently from 
the process of knowing, and that its nature and properties are 
not constituted or affected by its being known (Good, 1973) . 
(7) Semantic space. A space or region which is Eu­
clidean in character. A concept is then seen as a point 
in this space which can be measured by a set of scales 
representing all of the linear dimensions. The dimensions 
emerge with impressive regularity after factor analysis. 
They are, in decreasing order of their magnitude and frequency 
of appearance, (1) the evaluative dimension, (2) the potency 
dimension, and (3) the activity dimension. Hence, the 
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evaluative factor is usually the largest and first to be 
extracted. The activity is next and is seen to be one-
half the magnitude of the evaluative. Potency, is, then, 
one-half the magnitude of activity. Any other factors that 
emerge follow this same pattern (Osgood, Suci and Tannen-
baiam, 1957) . 
(8) Scales, qualifiers, or adjectival pairs. The bi­
polar sets of adjectives constituting the semantic dif­
ferential. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The review of literature pertaining to this investiga­
tion can be divided into five major sections: (1) Cross-
Cultural Studies; (2) The Linguistic-Relativity Hypothesis; 
(3) Translation and Sampling in Cross-Cultural Studies; (4) 
The Semantic Differential Technique as a Measure of Philo­
sophical Orientation; and (5) The Measurement of Philosophi­
cal Attitudes. A presentation and discussion of each of 
these areas follows. 
Cross-Cultural Studies 
This century has witnessed the marvels of science and 
technology in many respects. The revolution which has 
occurred in the means of communication has made distances in­
significant. Hence, the world is getting smaller and smaller 
by each invention in transportation and communication. An 
American in the remotest part of the country can now pick up 
the phone and call almost any country in the world. Such fast 
and efficient ways of transmitting one's experiences have 
narrowed the gap between cultures and civilizations. No 
matter how much a society might try to isolate itself it 
will always be subjected to the myriad of influences from the 
outside world. 
This phenomenon of cross-cultural interaction intrigued 
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scientists even before the eighteenth century. Many 
studies in history and anthropology were conducted to discover 
and record facts about the human race in the different 
spots of the world. Comparative cultural studies, however, 
were confined to materialistic or physical aspects of these 
cultures (relics, folklore, dress, food, etc.) Such ap­
proaches to studying cultures are incomplete. They lack the 
ability to identify the reasons for a culture dressing or 
eating the way it does. Osgood, May, and Miron (1975) 
defined the limits between material traits and nonmaterial 
traits, calling the second one "subjective culture." This 
term will be used by this researcher. 
Cross-cultural investigations are gold mines for social 
scientists who, after all, are trying to study human indica­
tors and the effects of such indicators on society. By 
comparative studies of societal indicators in different 
cultures, those scientists will be able to add to their 
reservoir of knowledge about man. Yet these literature 
searches revealed a lack of cross-cultural studies. American 
sociologists tend to study primarily American society and 
its multifold problems, as do the French sociologists study 
French culture and so on. The findings of sociologists in 
each country are often confined to the geographical and/or 
cultural limits of that country, so their solutions are 
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limited. 
In the beginning of the sixties, an opposite phenomenon 
occurred when the Beatles caught the attention of the social 
scientists almost everywhere. The Beatles' long hair and 
clothing spread like fire in Europe, America and even the 
Middle East. This occurrence posed a bewildering question 
to sociologists and psychologists. How can one explain their 
popularity and the rapid adoption of their ways in many 
foreign cultures? Music is part of culture. With this 
premise in mind different cultures should not be willingly 
accepting music or songs from foreign ones. But it happened. 
Examples of this nature are numerous. 
Cross-cultural research has limited itself tradition­
ally to different cultures in terms of geographical confine­
ment. More recently, however, the intracultural differences 
which are accounted for by religion, language, race, and 
ethnic grouping have also been investigated. In 1976, in­
vestigators Amir^ Haliva and Sagie tested the hypothesis 
that there are overall differences between Arab and Jewish 
groups in both attitudinal and behavioral aspects of commit­
ment to keeping a promise. The research was conducted on 
77 Arab and 48 Western Jewish children. The stimuli used 
consisted of open-ended situational stories that had to be 
reacted to by giving the response "I will do . . or "I 
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will not do . . after the subject had committed himself 
to a promise to do something. For example, if the subject 
promised to be on time for school, the story would involve 
a complicated situation that would put him/her in a very 
difficult position so that breaking the promise would be 
likely. The results revealed that an average of 33.4% of 
all commitments were kept for Jews, and 33.1% for Arabs. The 
researchers concluded that there were no significant dif­
ferences among the two groups. 
One tends to look with doubt at the findings of this 
report for the following reasons: 
(1) The situations for commitment were all related to 
family entities like brothers, mother, and father. Such 
members of the family - especially the mother and the father 
- are held not merely in respect in the Arab culture but in 
reverence. The writers neglected to account for this 
aspect of Arab culture. 
(2) The teacher at the elementary level in the Arab 
world is looked upon by the pupils as a subject for respect 
and a source of awe and brutality; the Western teacher does 
not enjoy this reputation. However, both Arab -ind Jewish 
teachers conducted the research. Consequently, the findings 
may be unreliable since the Arab pupils may tend to go 
along with what their teacher expects from them more so than 
the Jewish pupils. 
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Martinez (1976) used the semantic differential tech­
nique to compare Chicano and Anglo high school students in 
terms of effects of ethnicity on the different affective 
meanings. He divided 288 subjects from Southern California 
into four equal groups of 72 subjects representing both sex 
and ethnic backgrounds. All the subjects responded in English 
by rating three concepts: father, mother, and self, with 15 
scales of bipolar adjectives (5 pairs for the evaluative, 
potency, and activity factors). The analysis of variance 
done on the scales showed a significant interaction of 
ethnicity on the different affective meanings; (F (15,270) 
/ 
= 9.37, ^  < .001). 
Consalvi (1971) found no significant difference between 
Arab and American students,, attending the American University 
of Beirut, in their responses to value judgements that in­
volved morality. The findings held as long as the statements 
were general (e.g., dating, politics, etc.). Twenty-one 
of the 55 statements used in this, study, however, were 
specific (e.g., pre-marital sex> communism), and they showed 
significant differences between the median ratings. Con­
salvi applied the same statements to Arab students at the 
same university. They were different in religion (Moslem, 
Christian), nationality (Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian, 
Palestinians, North African, and Arabian), and sex. The 
results yielded no significant rating differences among this 
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intra-Arab group in terms of their severity of the judgement. 
Consalvi hastened to point out that his Arab sample was not 
representative of the Arab culture as a whole. Rather, it 
represented the upper class and hence "it is evident that our 
sample diverges to some unknown degree from the population of 
Arabs in general, that is, beyord the extent to which college 
populations usually deviate from the general population of 
any country" (Consalvi, 1971, p. 107). 
In an attempt to discover and identify differences 
and similarities between educational philosophies of prospec­
tive American (N = 137) and Arab (N = 108) teachers, Naser 
(1966) used a test of 103 items pertaining to questions on 
educational philosophies and practices. The result of this 
study revealed no significant difference (no level of sig­
nificance reported) in the extremity of expression of atti­
tudes between the two groups. However, testing the educa­
tional philosophy of the Ss resulted in significant dif­
ferences (t = 4.620, P < .001). 
Rettig and Pasamanick (1960) investigated the differences 
in the moral norms of two different cultural groups of Far 
Eastern academic intellectuals. The study had 165 Indian and 
Korean students at an American university, compared with 41 
American students. The test was simply an individual inter­
view conducted by an interviewer from the same country as 
subject. Each subject was requested to rate a set of 35 
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morally prohibited activities as to their offensiveness or 
desirability. Results showed that a larger degree of stability 
in the general order of the various moral prohibitions was 
observed in the Eastern group than in the American group. 
But moral value hierarchy may possess a greater degree of 
universality than might have been expected; at least in 
literate societies. The reported rank-order correlation of the 
self-judgement ranged between 0.85 and 0.91 for the Eastern 
Ss while the American Ss exhibited 0.81. The writers con­
cluded that the Americans were more lenient in their moral 
judgements than Easterners. 
As has been pointed out, the thrust of cross-cultural 
studies has been predominantly concerned with material 
traits. Subjective culture, however, is now becoming promi­
nent, and human nature is under the microscope instead of 
material aspects. Wrightsman notes : 
For most of us, "human nature" is a pervasive and use­
ful concept. We rely on it to justify our own behavior 
and the behavior of others. Our beliefs about it in­
fluence everything from the way we bargain with a used 
car dealer to our expectations about a nuclear war. 
Yet research psychologists and sociologists have al­
most completely ignored the scientific study of people's 
attitudes towards their fellow man. We seem so intent 
on making it explicit that there is no such thing as 
"the human nature" that we appear unaware that the 
average man believes that there is, and he employs his 
philosophy of human nature in his dealings with others 
(1964, p. 743). 
Cantril (1965) tried to measure the patterns of people's 
concerns in various countries through "the self-anchoring 
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striving scale." The scale consisted of a ladder device 
with 11 steps. The subject was asked to define the best 
life for himself (hope) and place it at the top step, the 
worst life (fear) at the bottom, and then indicate on the 
rest of the nine steps where he stood at that time. The 
outcome allowed the researcher to compare the subject's 
future versus his/her past as well as that of the nation. 
Also, he was able to compare the same aspect in terms of 
the nation versus the person and the nation versus another 
nation. 
Lambert and Klineberg (1967) reported a study conducted 
on six, ten, and fourteen-year-old children in 11 cultures 
representing the following countries : The United States of 
America, South Africa (Bantu children only), Brazil, England, 
Canada, French Canada, France; Germany, Israel; Japan, 
Lebanon, and Turkey. The object of this study was to 
determine the origin and development of national stereotypes 
in the minds of children. The subjects were asked questions 
like "What are you?", which nationalities were "like" 
theirs, and from which countries they preferred to be. 
Findings were so general that every variable was found to be 
important. Thus, no specific conclusion was reached. 
Crissman (1942) developed a questionnaire consisting 
of 50 items on prohibited moral codes and submitted it to 848 
college students at two American universities. It embraced 
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50 questions each of which posed some familiar and basic 
situation or behavioral reaction. The statements ranged from 
"Killing a person in defense of one's own life," to "Be­
lieving in God," and "Not giving to charity when able", or 
"married persons using birth-control devices" (p. 30). 
Respondents were to evaluate each of the 50 acts or situa­
tions in terms of a scale of "rightness" or "wrongness" 
ranging from 1 to 10. The author reported that "the sole 
reason for employing the above scale is the assumption that 
the results obtained therefrom are statistically more re­
liable than would be the case were fewer alternatives pro­
vided" (p. 29). The results showed that 40 items were rated 
more severely by women than by men; of these, 24 were to a 
degree of having a statistical reliability of .88 or more. 
Although Crissman's questionnaire was devised long ago 
(1939), yet another researcher, Tomeh (1968), used Criss­
man's questionnaire verbatim to compare the moral values of 
Students in a Middle East college and at an American uni­
versity. She considered 150 American subjects (average age 
22.18 years) from the University of Ohio, and 136 Middle 
Eastern subjects. The two cultural groups were comparable 
insofar as college status, age, and sex were concerned. The 
results showed that Middle Eastern subjects were signifi­
cantly (.05 level) core severe in their overall judgement of 
moral codes than were the Americans. In fact, 80% of the 
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items were judged more severely by the Middle Easterners 
than by the Americans. However, when the moral judgements 
were measured in terms of the rank-order, the similarity be­
tween the two groups was significant (rho = .90). The writer 
concluded, "this result leads one to believe that the various 
value orientations are complex but definitely patterned 
(rank-ordered) principles which give order and direction to 
action and thoughts and which are essential to the function­
ing of the moral system" (p. 38). She even suggested the 
existence of a "universal aspect of value orientation," a 
conclusion which could be attributed not only to human nature 
as she had emphasized, but also to the influence of religion. 
She neglected to reveal whether the two groups were comparable 
in religion, and it is doubtful that the American group had 
any Moslems. One raises the question of religion here, since 
it is a major factor in deciding almost all moral judgements 
and ethics for Moslems. Hence, the differences reported 
in the severity of judgement between Middle Eastern subjects 
and Americans may not be due to cultures only since religion 
was probably the deciding factor. Then, too, the similarity 
in the rank-ordering, can be accounted for by religion. 
Religion in essence tries to govern the moral aspects in man's 
life and to regulate the societal relationships according to 
those broad morals. Hardly any religion asks man to kill. 
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to steal, or to lie. The effect of religion on culture is 
significant whether it is negative or positive. 
Many countries are hindered from being prosperous and 
strong by the fact that their religions are dominant in 
every aspect of their people's lives. Bochner (1976) hy­
pothesized that there were "individual and cultural dif­
ferences in the degree to which religion is differentiated 
from other subjective social structures." He conducted a 
study where his subjects were Pakistani, Javanese, Thai, and 
Philippine adults with an overall average age of 34. All 
had been trained and subjected to European and American 
cultures for an average of three years. The total number 
was 68 distributed as follows; 14 Pakistani (Moslems), 8 
Javanese (Moslems), 23 Thai (Buddist), and 23 Philippine 
(Christians, Catholic and Protestant). The procedure 
consisted of a face-to-face interview for two hours (no 
detailed statement on the substance of the interview men­
tioned) . Towards the end of the interview, the subject was 
asked to complete ten sentences starting with "I am . . . ." 
The object of these sentences was to have the subject to 
determine how he saw himself. Each sentence was scored for 
the presence or absence of religious reference. "The ob­
served proportions were treated as normalized frequencies, 
and a x -one-sample test was applied to these data . . . ." 
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The analysis confirmed that the four groups differed with 
respect to the proportion of subjects who made one or more 
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religious references (% = 65.01, df = 3, P < .001) (Bochner, 
1976, p. 13). Furthermore, the data indicated that among 
Moslems, the religious role was more "salient" and,there­
fore, supposedly less differentiated from the self-concept 
than among members of the other groups. He maintained that 
when "religious-self-awareness is experimentally heightened 
it causes a variety of behavioral and attitudinal effects" 
(p. 16). The same conclusion was reached in a study done by 
Borgardus (1928). This author reported that subjects pre­
ferred to interact with those who were from the same religion 
and their attitudes differed substantially from those of 
other religious groups in the same country. 
Lambert and Klineberg (1967) reached a similar con­
clusion in their study on national profiles cited previous­
ly. In the Lebanese example, they found that the Moslem 
sample tended to relate in terms of "likeness" to the 
neighboring Arab countries (mostly Moslems). The Christian 
sample, on the other hand, chose the French, British, and 
Americans — a sad fact which has helped perpetuate the civil 
wars in Lebanon. 
Kumata and Schramm (1956) tried to explore the possi­
bilities of using the semantic differential in a translated 
form in other cultures, in much the same way as it had been 
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used in the American culture. The materials used were 
20 qualifiers or adjectival pairs with high loadings on 
the three major dimensions reported by Osgood, Suci, and 
Tannenbaum (1957), and 20 concepts containing names of the 
nationalities of the subjects and famous political figures 
both in the West and the East. The subjects used were 25 
bilingual Japanese and 22 bilingual Korean students at 
a midwestern university. A comparison group of 24 American 
students was also selected. The three groups received two 
administrations of the test with three weeks between testings. 
The foreign groups received the first test in their native 
language, the second one in English. Results reported con­
curred with Osgood's study; a factor analysis (Varimax) 
produced a first factor identified as evaluative which 
accounted for more than 34% of the variance. The difference 
between groups was not significant as tested by Friedman's 
2 X (no level of significant reported). The researchers 
maintained that indices of factorial similarity for the bi-
linguals taking the SD test in two languages were as high as 
those for the American controls who took the test twice in 
English. This result encouraged and led Osgood, May, and 
Miron (1975) to write, "in other words, shifting from one 
language form to another translation-equivalent language form 
had no noticeable influence on affective semantic structure" 
(p. 66). 
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The previous study reported the SD technique as its major 
tool for testing across cultures. This technique was in­
itiated by Charles Osgood and his colleagues in the fifties. 
They set a goal for themselves that was both ingenious and 
original. With the SD technique the measurement of meaning 
as an index for the complicated implications of the objects, 
persons, and ideas of man became relatively scientific and 
objective. Before considering this technique it would be use­
ful to treat seriously its background —one which lies in the 
Linguistic-Relativity Hypothesis, or the Linguistic 
Weltanschaung Hypothesis. 
The Linguistic-Relativity Hypothesis 
The Greek philosophers took it for granted that language 
was a universal essence of reason shared by all human beings. 
They believed that words were the medium in which this "es­
sence of reason" found expression. This meant that an idea 
or a thought expressed in one language could be translated 
into any other language, without losing its meaning. Such 
a view persisted in the academic world for more than two 
thousand years. 
Whorf challenged this notion of the universality of 
language. He maintained that thought is relative to the 
language by which it is expressed. Speakers of different 
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languages see the world differently and evaluate it dif­
ferently. Thinking he says, is relative to the language 
learned. 
Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, 
strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a 
particular grammar, and differs, from slightly to 
greatly, between different grammars. We dissect nature 
along lines laid down by our native languages. The 
categories and types that we isolate from the world 
of phenomena we do not find there, because they stare 
every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world 
is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions 
which has to be organized by our minds - and this 
means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds 
(1956, pp. 212-213). 
Whorf was actually echoing Edward Sapir's thoughts on 
the same subject. However, Sapir went further by drawing 
the dichotomy between language and culture. He disputed 
the notion that both are interrelated, a characteristic 
which he gave to thought. He noted: 
Nor can I believe that culture and language are in 
any true sense causally related. Culture may be 
defined as what society does and thinks. Language 
is a particular how of thought. It is difficult to 
see what particular causal relations may be expected 
to subsist between a selected inventory of experience 
(culture, a significant selection made by society) 
and the particular manner in which society expresses 
all experience. The drift of culture, another way of 
saying history, is a complex series of changes in 
society's selected inventory - additions, losses, 
changes of emphasis and relation. The drift of 
language is not properly concerned with changes of 
content at all, merely with changes in formal ex­
pression (1921, p. 218). 
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was examined with skepticism 
by many linguists. Carroll (1964) could not decide whether 
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to accept this hypothesis or not. He cited research by E. H. 
Lenneberg and J. M. Roberts who published an article in the 
Indiana University Publications in Anthropology and Linguistics 
(Memoir 13, 1956), on the ability of the speakers of Zuni 
(American Indian language spoken in New Mexico) to recognize 
and remember colors. He compared the findings of this re­
search to that of a previous one done by the same researcher 
on the speakers of English. The results were strikingly 
different. Some colors considered highly codable (prompt 
response and high agreement among subjects) by English 
speakers were poorly codable by Zuni. Differences, Carroll 
maintained, can always be interpreted as due to known cultural 
factors. He praised the semantic differential technique 
responsible for naming the three factors that persisted in 
the study of meaning: evaluative, potency and activity. 
Berlin and Kay (1969) offered data on some 20 languages 
with the intention of pointing out the universality of the 
color concepts. The experiment was based on color-term 
elicitation with respect to a standardized Munsell chart 
consisting of 320 chips, varying-through 40 equally spaced 
hues at maximal saturation and in eight degrees of 
brightness. They supplemented the data with inferences 
from the color vocabularies of 98 languages reported as 
an abstract or basic color terms. Data supported the notion 
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that 11 basic color terms (white, black, red, green, 
yellow, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, and gray) are com­
mon to all languages. The evidence was drawn from the close 
clustering of similar terms in the 20 languages under study. 
The second unexpected finding was that there were strict 
and ordered constraints upon the colors that were linguis­
tically differentiated when less than 11 abstract colors were 
used. Only 22 "types" of terminologies of the 2048 combina­
tions possible were in fact found (around 1%). 
The problems with this study lie in the sampling pro­
cedure. The highest number of subjects in any language was 
reported to be 31 (Tzeltal speakers). Some languages were 
represented by only one speaker, and in those cases the one 
speaker was often bilingual. Although Berlin and Kay were 
trying to refute the Language-Relativity hypothesis, 
which their data partially supported, the sampling procedure 
was not reliable. Also, their two conclusions seem to cancel 
each other out. The first one regarding the 11 basic-
colors in languages is incompatible with the second finding 
that only 1% of the term-combinations in 98 languages cluster 
whenever less than 11 color concepts are used. 
On the other hand, in a study of fifth and sixth graders, 
Munro and Deregowski (1976) tested the hypothesis that dif­
ferences in familiarity with the language medium might account 
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for cross-cultural differences in response to pictorial stimu­
li more satisfactorily than any possible cultural dif­
ferences in perceptual processing. The sample consisted of 
144 white English-speaking fifth and sixth graders, plus 59 
"mixed race," and Asian sixth graders who used English and 
Gujerati at home. 
Materials consisted of four sheets of paper, each with 
a picture of four children playing around two trees at the top 
of the page. Instructions written in English at the bottom 
asked the subjects to name the four boys. The same instruc­
tions were translated into Shona. Responses were classified 
into polyphasic (ppp), instantaneous (cpp), and unclassi­
fied (?) . 
Results showed that the Shona-medium-group showed a 
preference for cpp responses and the English-medium subjects 
showed no preference. The difference between these groups, 
2 however, was not significant (x = 0.70). 
Munro and Deregowski concluded that the study "fails to 
support the hypothesis that the language medium used for 
responses to an ambiguous pictorial stimulus accounts for 
cross-cultural differences in interpretation, or apparent 
differences in perception" (1976, p. 114) . 
The Language-Relativity Hypothesis contends that language 
is a prerequisite to thinking. Sapir (1921) and Sapir (1958) 
spoke about the "inner language" and how one actually talks 
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while he is thinking. He argued that all the organs of 
speech function while we thi nk. 
To bridge the gap among world cultures created by the 
differences in languages, Shenton, Sapir, and Jespersen 
(1931) proposed an international auxiliary language which, 
should serve as a broad base for every type of inter­
national understanding, which means, of course, in 
the last analysis, for every type of expression of the 
human spirit which is of more than local interest, 
which in turn can be restated so as to include any 
and all human interests (1931, pp. 70-71). 
The purpose of this international lingua-franca is to 
prevent the individual from thinking in his own language-
transfer creating a barrier for those who do not speak the 
language. Whorf (1956) argued that thinking is controlled 
by laws of linguistic patterns of which the individual is 
unconscious. He commented: 
These patterns are the unperceived intricate 
systematization of his own language - shown readily 
enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other 
languages, especially those of a different linguistic 
family. And every language is a "vast-pattern" system, 
different from others, in which are culturally or­
dained the forms and categories by which the personal­
ity not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, 
notices or neglects types of relationship and 
phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the 
house of his consciousness (1956, p. 252). 
Greenberg (1971) tried to reach a compromise with 
whorfs theory which stirred both linguists and psychologists. 
He accepted the notion that the vast linguistic diversity is 
only one facet of human sociocultural diversity. But he 
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maintained that there are some "universal properties" found 
in all cultural groups like tool-making, the institution of 
marriage, etc. Such properties must have linguistic concepts 
to be communicable which means that there must be some 
language universals involved. 
As noted earlier, Osgood's work goes against the whole 
Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis. In fact, he started a new method of 
psychological assessment based on the measurement.of "meaning" 
with a premise that there is a universality in the affective 
meaning of all languages. Osgood (1959) questioned the 
Language-Relativity Hypothesis by asking questions like 
"Do the Navajo, like ourselves, see happy as more up and 
sad as more down? Do the Japanese, like ourselves, conceive 
of excitement as colorful and calm as colorless?" (1960-1961, 
p. 146) . He started the first attempt to see whether the 
visual-verbal synesthetic relationships in one language/ 
culture are shared by other languages/cultures. He utilized 
28 concepts, heavy, good, blue, slow, sad, etc., and 13 bi­
polar adjectival scales with visual alternatives, blunt-
sharp, near-far, crooked-straight, etc. The materials were 
submitted to subjects from four languages/cultures (Navajos: 
N = 40; Mexicans: N = 10; Anglos: N = 25; Japanese: N = 20). 
Each subject was asked to judge the concept by the visual 
alternatives containing the bipolar adjectival scales and 
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to decide on the most appropriate scale "for that concept. 
Data showed no significant results when cross-cultural 
synesthetic tendencies were tested, and when the intra-
cultural ones were examined, results showed similarities also. 
Osgood (1959) concluded that the Whoff-Sapir Hypothesis is 
false. His last remark on that stated his belief; 
People are equipped biologically to react to situations 
in certain similar ways - with automatic, emotional 
reactions to rewarding and punishing situations 
(evaluation), with strong and weak muscular tension 
do things offering great or little resistance 
(potency), and so on - and hence they can form conno-
tative significances for perceived objects and their 
linguistic signs varying along the same basic dimen­
sions (1959, p. 169). 
Translation and Sampling in Cross-Cultural 
Studies 
White (1955) reported that a researcher, aided by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, studied the U.N. transcriptions 
looking for differences in concepts due to language. He 
mentioned some interesting cases. An English speaker in one 
of those cases says: "I assume"; the French interpreter 
renders it "I deduce"; and the Russian colleague says "I 
consider". By that time the whole concept of assumption is 
lost. The researcher, after isolating 20 similar cases, 
concluded that while the translation technique is valid and 
appears smooth, the "degree of communication between the 
Russian and English-speaking delegates appears to be nil" 
in those 20 cases. 
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Different language/cultures pose serious obstacles in 
the method of translating their concepts into other languages. 
The traditional belief among linguists is that languages of 
the same family are easier to translate into one another. 
The real problems, they grant, lie in the cross-family 
translation which in fact is a confession in itself that 
languages of different pattern-structure render different 
concepts. Sefler (1974) analyzed Ludwig Wittgenstein's 
views on the relationship of language and society. He 
wrote: 
Looking at Wittgenstein's view, we observe that 
language is relative to man as speaker, but an objec­
tivity remains. Even though the limits of language 
are the limits of world, there is a presupposition 
that my world is your world, my language your language, 
from the viewpoint of everyday language (1974, p. 107) . 
A romantic viewpoint indeed! Examination of some aspects of 
the problems of translation in cross-cultural works will 
reveal the validity of Wittgenstein's optimism. 
Catford generalized that translation between media is 
impossible. That is, the translation cannot be done from the 
spoken to the written form of a text or vice-versa. He also 
emphasized that translation between either of the medium-
levels (phonology and graphology) and the levels of grammar 
and lexis is impossible. That means one cannot "translate" 
from SL phonology (source language) to TL grammar (target 
language) or SL lexis to TL graphology (Catford, 1965, p. 
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53). He emphasized that any translation is doomed when there 
arises either difficulty in linguistic and/or cultural con­
tent. Lexical translation, he pointed out, without its gram­
matical counterpart is the poorest of all translations, 
since the word can take on more than one meaning. If we look 
at a decent dictionary we find this to be true. Apparently, 
cross-cultural research using Su technique has always manipu­
lated the lexical translation. No complete sentences or 
phrases have been used, only single word stimuli. 
Sechrest, Todd, and Zaidi (1972) pointed to four types 
of translation problems in cross-cultural research. The first 
is that most often the translator does not know why and what 
he is translating: he is translating sentences and sounds 
which, in his mind, do not bear any relevance whatsoever. 
Hence, his translation becomes weak and lifeless. The second 
pitfall that faces the researcher in translation is the 
assumption that the translation is adequate without even 
checking or rechecking. The writers granted that, in general, 
it is safer to assume the adequacy of short phrases or 
passages than of long ones - an opinion which is not ac­
cepted by most linguists. The third problem is the issue of 
cultural differences and their effects on translation. 
The writers correctly assumed that within one culture a re­
searcher is likely to face those differences when studying 
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its sub-culture. Catford (1965) found that a translation at 
the cultural-differences level is impossible. The fourth 
problem occurs when the translation of responses is reversed 
back to the source language. In most cases this process 
loses a lot of its effect because the translator will be 
working on a distorted version of the source language by 
that time. Thus, if we have English words translated into 
Arabic and then the responses are to be translated back into 
English, the translator from Arabic to English may be using 
a weak version of Arabic that does not accurately correspond 
to their English counterparts. Hence, the more a version is 
translated, the further away it is taken from its origin, 
until finally an unintelligible or even illegible version is 
reached. 
The writers discussed the vocabulary equivalence as 
one problem in translation. They agreed that a good 
dictionary is indispensable at this stage. However, the 
language in it does not reflect the language of the people. 
They advised the use of educated translators as they are 
acquainted with the language used by the subjects. They 
neglected to define the limit of the translators' education. 
Is it confined to being bilingual? Linguistic? In Arabic, 
for example, there are 70 words which mean "lion," 
more than 35 which mean "sword." Which of those many 
options would the translator decide to pick? The vocabulary 
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equivalence is hard to maintain when languages under con-' 
sideration do not belong to the same family. The degree of 
complexity is less severe when translating from English into 
German than from German or English into Arabic. 
Werner and Campbell (1970) do not favor idiomatic 
translation. However, they allow the usage of the closest 
equivalent idiom in the target language to be used, an al­
lowance which may hurt the translation more than benefit it. 
They also allow for the usage of equivalence of references 
rather than language when cultural differences are unavoid­
able. Cultural translation in this case, rather than 
linguistic translation, is an alternative not to be ignored. 
But cultural translation leaves too much room for the biases 
and idiosyncrasies of the translator. The background of the 
translator at this stage determines the accuracy of his work. 
Werner and Campbell are credited with introducing the back 
translation notion. They believed that this method is much 
better than the one-way or direct translation. In the back-
translation a piece will be translated into a target language, 
then the same translated piece will be given to another 
translator to translate back into the source language (now 
target language). By successive translations and back-
translations the researcher will be able to decide on an 
acceptable version. Shortcomings of these methods were 
discussed earlier. 
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Back—translation may work effectively in contextual 
pieces of writing, but in a situation where there is only 
a single word to be translated out of any context, this tac­
tic may render itself useless. In case of homonyms if a 
word is translated into English as "fair" it may be back-
translated to its source language as "just" or "light-
colored, " 
Cantril (1965) said; 
One of the methods often utilized in this translation 
process was to have someone who knew the native language 
as a native, for example, an Arab, and who was complete­
ly fluent in English translaté our questions into 
Arabic. Then someone whose native language was English 
but who had a perfect command of Arabic would translate 
the Arabic back into English so a comparison could be 
made with the original question and, through discussion 
and further comparisons, difficulties would be ironed 
out (1965, p, 26). 
But how does one really know that the bilingual trans­
lator has a command of both languages as native speakers do? 
Winograd, Cohen, and Barresi (1976) showed that bilingual 
speakers should show poorer memory for the language in which 
concrete words appeared than the language in which abstract 
words appeared (p. 323). Results of two experiments on 30 
German-English bilinguals, one using recognition memory pro­
cedure and the other the free-recall task, showed opposite 
results. Memory for concrete words was superior to that of 
abstract words. 
Osgood, May, and Miron (1975) have discussed extensively 
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the problems in cross-cultural studies. They warned against 
using only bilingual subjects to avoid the pitfalls of trans­
lation. Such sampling procedure would not reflect the true 
essence of the culture/language involved in the study. 
Statistically speaking, the sample would be highly selective 
and it would reflect (for the English-speaking investigators) 
the most westernized people, and the sought-for cultural dif­
ferences might disappear as a result (p. 15). Indeed, one 
has to make a choice here. The doubtful translations al­
ways limit the reliability and validity of cross-cultural 
studies, as does the bilingual sample responding in a second 
language. 
Sampling in cross-cultural studies is not limited to 
its conventional meaning. The researcher cannot draw in­
ferences that encompass the human race by ex3îr.ining only a 
selected group of subjects from one selected language/culture. 
Chua, Campbell, and Yoo (1974) called attention to the dif­
ferences in the patterns of responses exercised by different 
culture groups. They asked 187 students at the University 
of Michigan and 204 students at a Korean university to respond 
to 130 item questionnaire dealing with various facets of 
interpersonal and sociopolitical trust. The questionnaire 
used was a five-point Likert format with response categories 
of "(1) Strongly agree, (2) Mildly agree, (3) Agree and 
disagree equally, (4) Mildly disagree, and (5) Strongly 
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disagree" " (1974, p. 471). Since the standard deviation was 
an index of extreme response style in this case, it was 
computed for each item. The American sample showed .87 to 
1.45 while Koreans showed .58 to 1.17. The difference be­
tween the two means yielded significant results at the .001 
level. They concluded that there was a difference in response 
extremity between Americans and Koreans, and consequently 
recommended that all future research on cross-cultural 
studies should report that difference so that the data can be 
interpreted correctly. 
Lack of complete objectivity on the part of the re­
searcher represents another problem. As Osgood, May, and 
Miron (1975) pointed out, researchers tend to project their 
own biases in interpreting data collected in cross-cultural 
studies. Such biases cannot be eliminated, but at least 
they should be recognized. 
One last remark on cross-cultural inventories is in 
order. It is hard to standardize measurements and tests 
pertaining to soliciting cultural differences. Cortadade Kohan 
(1976) maintained that each language/culture should be 
treated separately, since there is no way to have 100% 
correct translation of any language. Cultural bias is the 
everlasting danger that threatens cross-cultural studies, 
and minimizing this danger is correlated with caution and 
care in translation. Adequate translation is possible. But 
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absolute accuracy is impossible for the reasons developed 
above. 
The Semantic Differential as a Measure of 
Philosophical Orientations 
Since philosophical concepts are best correlated with 
the affective domain, the medium of language as a means to 
assess those concepts is indispensable. Osgood, Suci, and 
Tannenbaum (1957) offered the semantic differential technique 
as another alternative to measuring "meaning. " They believed 
that ideas are conveyed in terms of adjectives. Conse­
quently, adjectives are the indices of a language which, 
in turn, is the index of a culture. If adjectives can be 
measured then, in fact, the measurement can be done on the 
"meaning^ " With this logic.- Charles Osgood and his col­
leagues introduced the semantic differential technique. 
Description of the semantic differential technique 
The technique is easy to construct. It consists of 
concepts (e.g., war, mother, friend, etc.) which are rated on 
scales of bipolar adjectives (e.g., good-bad, high-low, 
beautiful-ugly, etc.). There is no standardized form which 
can be used in all research. The concepts will vary according 
to the need of the researcher. What results from factor 
analyzing the concept/scale interaction is the location of 
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each concept in "semantic space" - a space with an unknown 
number of dimensions but which has a common origin or zero-
point for all scales. The further a concept is from the 
origin the more "meaningful" the concept. Osgood, Suci, and 
Tannenbaum (1957); Weinreich (1958). 
The same writers reported three dominant orthogonal 
factors which have appeared consistently: an evaluative 
factor (good-bad), a potency factor (strong-weak), and an 
activity factor (fast-slow). Together these account for about 
50-60% of concept "meanings," with the evaluative factor being 
the most dominant- Other factors of less importance are re­
ported, too, but they are not usually significant. Lavoie 
and Bentler (1972) identified four more factors; density 
(numerous-sparse), orderliness (haphazard-systematic), 
reality (authentic-fake), and familiarity (commonplace-
exceptional) . Komorita and Bass (1967) reported a study done 
on 220 undergraduate students at Wayne State University. Two 
concepts were used on 16 evaluative scales: (1) American 
foreign policy in Vietnam, and (2) draft deferments for 
married students. The rotated-factor matrices for the two con­
cepts showed three distinct factors present for each concept. 
"Factor I may be interpreted as a 'functional-nonfunctional 
evaluative factor'; Factor II represents an 'affective-
emotional factor' and seems to be a noncognitive, evaluative 
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factor; Factor III seems to represent a 'moral-ethical 
factor,• and might be described in terms of the normative 
function of attitudes" (p. 242). They concluded that 
Osgood's evaluative factor does not always result in a 
general, unitary evaluation of an attitude, object or 
issue. 
Osgood, May, and Miron (1975) reported the first 
pan-cultural study to be done encompassing 27 languages/ 
cultures across five continents. Great similarities were 
attributed to the concepts used and the three usual factors 
emerged in terms of magnitude across language/culture groups. 
Based on this research and many others reported in their 
book, an "Atlas of Affective Meanings" has developed. Os­
good (1974) writes: "In sampling conceptual areas, we tried to 
tap potentially universal symbols (for example, colors and 
numbers), but also to represent those aspects of everyday life 
- kinship, foods, animals, technologies - which ethnologies 
regularly treat. Our 'Atlas' runs from A to Z" (p. 84). 
Reliability and validity 
Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) reported an average re­
liability of .85. In a study on 230 undergraduate university 
students to measure the change of attitude by using contro­
versial reading materials in an educational foundation course, 
Zerwekh (1970) reported high reliabilities ranging between 
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.826 and .935. LaVoie and Sentier (1974) also boasted 
high reliability estimates of .91, .77, .88, .83, .95, 
.65, and .84 for the seven factors discussed previously. 
Beran (1976) used the semantic differential technique 
in measuring the effects of modernization on attitudes 
towards play among children of Negros, Oriental Philippines. 
She reported reliability estimates ranging between .951 
and .721. The writer also observed high reliability alpha 
estimates in a pilot study on 200 undergraduate students 
using iz philosophical concepts and 20 bipolar scales 
or qualifiers. Estimates ranged between .93 and .98 for the 
evaluative factor. 
Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) maintained that 
since there is no "accepted quantitative criterion of mean­
ing" to compare the SD against the measurement of validity 
is difficult. They reported examples of studies done on 
the validity of SD technique. The first interesting example 
to be mentioned was that done by T. C. Rowan (1954), who made 
a direct comparison between the semantic differential tech­
nique and the methods of triads. One-hundred and sixty 
subjects were asked to judge the meaning of 10 concepts in 
two ways; (1) against 20 differential scales; and (2) 
without the use of scales, only on the basis of meaningful 
similarity. The analysis yielded a validity coefficient of 
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.975. 
Secondly, Margaret P. Reeves (1954) tested the validity 
of the semantic differential versus the Thematic Appreciation 
Test, particularly on the evaluative factor. Undergraduate 
students (N not reported) were shown 10 TAT pictures to 
judge against 20 scales on a semantic differential. Later, 
they were presented with the same pictures to reflect upon 
in a brief statement of the plot of a story that might be 
told about each picture. The statements were marked by 20 
TAT experts who grouped them in major themes. Each theme, rep­
resented by at least eight subjects, was judged on a "positive-
negative continuum." The most positive and most negative theme 
was selected. The data of the SD produced by the subjects who 
selected the specific theme were compared over "five clearly 
evaluative scales of the differential." The reported results 
were that in all cases the direction was the same, and on 
seven of the ten pictures the difference was significant at 
the .005 level. 
Darnell considered that the discovery of concept-scale 
interaction with the semantic differential was the best support 
of the validity of the instrument yet obtained. He conducted 
a test in which 139 students were asked to react, in terms 
of "best" or "worst" (scored plus and minus), to examples of 
a concept on SD scales. This was a reversal of the procedure 
employed in SD. He used 20 concepts identified in a 
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previous study by Osgood. The degree of similarity between 
the two "evaluative" factors was 0.97 and between the two 
"potency" factors 0.91. The coefficient between the two 
"activity" factors was 0.27 and between the two "fourth" 
factors 0.31 (Darnell, 1966, p. 114). 
Limitations of semantic differential technique 
Nunnally (1967) suggested that instead of using the three 
major factors (evaluative, potency, and activity), researchers 
should develop and employ groups of scales for particular 
purposes, a procedure to which Osgood and associates would not 
likely object. Another suggestion by the same writer 
is that concepts and scales should be comparable. So that 
a scale "sweet-sour" should not be used when a concept 
"plane" or "atomic bomb" is being considered. 
From the point of view of linguistics the whole meaning 
of a concept can not be indexed by the semantic differential 
technique, for the experiences carried by that concept cannot 
be completely described in the dimensional aspects of this 
technique. There is some artificiality in summing up all 
results and averaging them over many subjects. Concepts are 
idiosyncratic and depend on the individual * s particular 
experiences. Any similarity between the concepts of different 
individuals is a coincidence or chance resulting from the 
same experiences or parallel ones. 
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In relation to philosophy of human nature, Wrightsman 
(1974) favored the Likert-type scales more than the semantic 
differential technique. He cited an unpublished paper done 
by Marilyn King (1971) in which she compared both scales. 
Data were generated by 65 students responding on 17 SD scales. 
Then,,the same subjects responded to the same concepts (not 
mentioned) on a Likert-scale version. The factors incorpora­
ted in this battery were: trustworthiness, altruism, strength 
of will and rationality, independence, complexity, and 
variability. Correlations between scores on the two forms 
were generally high and in the same direction. For the first 
four factors the study reported correlation coefficients of: 
-.60, -.44, -.56, and -.57 all significant at the .001 level. 
The last two factors were nonsignificant (.02 and -.21). 
Based on this research, Wrightsman concluded that, since the 
results of the complexity and variability factors were non­
significant and nonpromising, the semantic differential is 
not a valid technique for measuring individual differences. 
Measurement of Philosophical Orientations 
The medium of language is the only means through which 
philosophical orientations of individuals are relatively 
possible. Individuals are asked to respond to a situational 
problem or complete a problem-story that involves ethics 
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and moral judgement. All this is done obviously through the 
use of language. Pittel and Mendelsohn (1966) summed up all 
the pitfalls of moral values measurements into six parts. 
First, they tend to measure moral knowledge rather than moral 
attitudes. Second, the scoring is done according to socially 
defined criteria rather than in its absolute form. Third, 
the judgements are asked about ethical concepts or abstrac­
tions rather than situational realities (this seems to 
contradict the second one). Fourth, sampling is usually 
limited, small, and very conventional in its moral outlook. 
Fifth, the orientation prior to the test tends to reflect an 
ideal response on the part of the subjects. Finally, the 
majority of the instruments have not been standardized for 
extensive use by different investigators. Such criticisms 
may be valid in the last decade, but in the present time many 
instruments have been standardized in terms of the technique, 
e.g., Likert-type and semantic differential. 
Wrightsman (1974) assumed six dimensions for the 
philosophies of human nature: trustworthiness, altruism, 
strength of will and rationality, independence, complexity, 
and variability. Twenty statements on each dimension were 
developed and Likert-type scales (measuring the extent of 
positive or negative evaluations of attitude objects), were 
constructed. He used 177 undergraduate Ss from three colleges. 
They were asked to rate the statements on a six-point scale 
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ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." The 
analysis of each item for each college showed that the results 
were different among colleges in terms of average responses 
and popularity for the same item. Another test, using 84 
of these statements which showed the largest group differ­
ences, was administered to 100 undergraduate and 100 graduate 
students for determining reliability. Split-half reliability 
coefficients were computed for two sets of seven items. All 
were above .60 for the undergraduates. Graduates yielded 
results ranging from .40 to .78. All were significantly 
different at the .01 level. 
Wrightsman discussed another type of philosophy measure­
ment for human nature: The Behavior Insight Test which is an 
open-ended situational test. He found no significant rela­
tionships with the Likert-type scale when used on 273 female 
undergraduates with the same statements from the previous 
study, 
Ross (1970) developed an 80 item-five-point-Likert 
scale inventory for measuring an individual's educational 
philosophy. The 80 statements included encompass four major 
philosophies; Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, and Existen­
tialism. The subject was asked to match the statement with 
the philosophy and then mark his response on the scale. 
In an attempt to investigate the content validity. 
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Ziomek, Smith, and Menne (1976) submitted the inventory to 
members of the American Educational Studies Association who 
were experts in the field of educational philosophy. They 
were asked to identify and evaluate the statements of the 
inventory. Only 36 responses were considered in this re­
search. The results showed that about half of the 80 items 
were inadequate. The other more adequate half was treated 
by first and second order factor analysis. Reliability esti­
mates for Idealism items was .73, Realism .69, Pragmatism 
.66, and Existentialism .68. All these estimates were com­
pared with the estimates in a similar study done by Villano 
(1971), and with the reported estimates found by Ross. 
The results concurred with Villano but not with Ross. The 
latter reported a split-half reliability estimate of .91 and 
a test-retest estimate of .93. The researchers concluded that 
the inventory "does not constitute a valid measure of any of 
the four categories as claimed by its author. No empirical 
evidence exists to support the use of the REPI, in its 
present form" (1976, p. 687"). 
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CHAPTER III. METHODS AND RESULTS 
Methods 
Subjects 
The Ss for this study were 338 university students 
whose first language was either English or Arabic. Selec­
tion criteria for students included some exposure to the 
philosophical terms incorporated in the instrument. The Ss 
were considered capable of reading a philosophical statement 
and being able to comprehend it. However, they were not 
assumed to be philosophically or analytically sophisticated. 
The Arab Ss were 162 students seeking higher education 
at the following universities: Iowa State University, Purdue 
University, University of California-Los Angeles, University 
of Colorado-Denver, and Detroit Institute of Technology. 
They were considered to be fairly homogeneous in their 
educational and social class backgrounds. Except for one 
subject from Morocco, the rest of the Arab sample came from 
the following Arab countries; Libya, Egypt, Palestine, 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait. All the Arabs in 
this study spoke Arabic regional dialects. However, all of 
them understood the standard Arabic as derived from the 
Koran (Moslems' Holy Book). While Arabic was their mother 
tongue they varied in degrees of English proficiency as a 
second language (range 8-12 years). Most of this sample 
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were pursuing higher degrees in scientific and technical 
fields. 
The American Ss were 176 undergraduate university 
students. Except for 45 students who responded to the 
instrument at U.C.L.A., all the Ss in the American sample 
were enrolled in an introductory foundations course during 
fall quarter of 1976 and winter of 1977 at Iowa State 
University. 
Instrument 
The instrument used was an evaluative form of the 
semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957) 
and consisted of 14 concepts, each of which were rated on 
20 bipolar adjectival pairs (qualifiers) using a seven-point 
continuum from one to seven. Scale orders were rotated and 
polarity directions randomized on different forms of the 
instrument to prevent biases of response order and position 
preferences. Fourteen of the scales (pure-impure, positive-
negative , superior-inferior, high-low, beneficial-harmful, 
good-bad, true-false, wise-foolish, important-inconsequential, 
safe-dangerous, harmonious-dissonant, clean-dirty, signifi­
cant-insignificant, and reputable-disreputable) were adapted 
from Osgood, May, and Miron (1975) for their reported high 
factor loadings (between .66 and .93). The other six pairs 
(rewarding-punitive, right-wrong, educated-ignorant. 
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affectionate-hateful, refined-vulgar, and original-ordinary) 
were chosen basically by using good judgement with respect 
to their relevance for the concepts being judged (Osgood, 
Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957, pp. 77-78). The rationale for 
employing only the evaluative dimension was based on the 
fact that this research had a homogeneous concept sample. 
Evaluative, potency, and activity structures are expected 
to emerge when a large and heterogeneous concept sample is 
employed, but not when the concept sample is homogeneous 
(Osgood, ioay, and Miron, 1975, p. 57). It is also reasonable to 
assume a relationship between the evaluative dimension and 
attitude measurement (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957). 
The 14 concepts chosen were descriptive statements 
derived from Ross (1970) and validated by Ziomek (1975). 
As shown in Table 1 (English version) and Table 2 (Arabic 
version), the concepts were selected to represent four major 
philosophies. These include: (1) Idealism as in concepts 
1, 5, 6 and 12, (2) Existentialism as in concepts 2, 8, 9, 
and 10; (3) Realism as in concepts 3, 7, and 11; and (4) 
Pragmatism as in concepts 4, 13, and 14. 
The instrument was initially constructed in English 
(Appendix A) . It was then translated into Arabic using 
the back-translation method. The final form of the Arabic 
version (Appendix B) was agreed upon by seven bilingual-
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Table 1. Concepts (English version) 
Concepts^ 
1. Values are objective, permanent and unchanging 
2. The authentic life is one of self-determination within 
a specific time and place 
3. Reality originates in the material and physical world 
4. The test of theory, belief or doctrine must be its 
effect upon us, its practical consequences 
5. Physical objects are ideas in the mind of the per-
ceiver, matter is not real 
6. Reality is spiritual or mental in nature 
7. Matter is real and concretely exists in its own right 
independently of the mind 
8. The essence of reality is choice 
9. The basis of morality is freedom 
10. Reality is determined when man chooses either to 
confront or avoid a situation, make or refuse 
to make a commitment 
11. Obtaining knowledge is essentially a process of 
searching the universe for facts 
12. The origin of knowledge is in a supernatural source 
13. Experiences constitute reality and govern responses 
to problems 
14. Knowledge is found by considering the practical 
consequences of ideas 
^Adapted from Ross (1970) . 
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Table 2. Concepts (Arabie version)^ 
Concepts 
- % 
0—3-^1 ^UJ' ^  
ù^   ^-1-»^-^ 2:rvc^ljJ' 
o ^ U J  .  
y U%aj^ I «^1>J I *C^ Û j 
<3 1^ ) O-—^ \—*" ( (/^ *U^ ^ 
u V j^l ^ LZj> ' </ CkÇ ^==yju»iy I jv_x^ ù J - \. 
C?\JLjL\ (y* -Sasyilil—» «»W C/**-. . 
V 
\ 
i  ^ Ô*-^  'jA*P I «nj»^^JLi I C/tf c),,>-,A^j û I - H 
c^vjîy ù-^ ù j C f \  
y «=3 O /  ^ J !/V Lf 3^  ^ ^=V.y*-l ^  *-* V j •" 
K^VL^- oO UXju* ^ «Hut^ yj jr® _ 11% 
" ^ \ - Y» I • 
*This table and Table 4 are handwritten as an Arabie 
typewriter is unavailable in the vicinity. 
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judges. 
Procedure 
In scoring the instrument, all scales were arranged so 
that 1 represented the positive and 7 the negative end of the 
scale. Table 3 shows the rearranged English scales and 
Table 4 the Arabic ones. 
Both Varimax and principal component factor analyses 
were used to refine the instrument. The manipulation of the 
principal component factor method was done to avoid the limi­
tations found In the Varimax technique, i.e., it had produced-
factors without obvious "psychological meaning" in previous 
studies (Osgood, May, and Miron, 1975, p. 108). Such 
analysis made possible the construction of a short, efficient 
SD with factors made up of qualifiers having maximal com­
parability between Arabic and English (Osgood, May, and Miron, 
1975, p. 170). The factor loadings for the principal 
component factor analysis are shown in Table 5, those for 
Varimax in Appendix C. Although factor loadings were dif­
ferent across concepts, all 20 scales seemed to be 
contributing to a coiranon evaluative dimension. However, the 
first 10 scales were considered the most consistent among 
all 14 concepts. The reliability of each concept was esti­
mated by Cronbach coefficient alpha estimate (Cronbach, 1951) 
using the 20 scales and the 10 highest leading factors in 
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Table 3.. English bipolar adjectival scales with positive 
values on the left 
Bipolar adjectival scales^ 
1. Pure Impure 
2. Positive Negative 
3. Right * Wrong 
4. Educated 
* 
Ignorant 
5. Superior Inferior 
6. High Low 
7. Beneficial Harmful 
8. Good Bad 
9. True False 
10. Wise Foolish 
11. Rewarding 
ic 
Punitive 
12. Important Inconsequential 
13. Safe Dangerous 
14. Original Ordinary 
15. Harmonious Dissonant 
16. Clean Dirty 
17. Refined Vulgar* 
18. Significant Insignificant 
19. Reputable Disreputable 
o
 
(N 
Af fectionate Hateful 
^Adapted from Osgood, May, and Miron (1975), otherwise 
indicated by an asterisk. 
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Table 4. Arabie bipolar adjectival scales with positive 
values on the left 
Bipolar adjectival scales 
M  A 
ou 
j ir-® -V 
- A 
.4 
-s\i Uî 
^  -IV 
» • m 
lJL/*—• _ \o 
-n 
^ w 
Ç/tX -\A 
W - c .  
TaOîle 5. Factor loadings (principal component) for twenty qualifiers 
across all philosophies in English (E) and Arabic (A) 
Concept 1 Concept 5 Concept 6 Concept 12 
E A E A E A E A  
1. Pure-impure .85 .68 .67 .72 .73 .74 .86 .83 
2. Positive-Negative .84 .78 .73 .78 .83 .75 .84 .82 
3. Right-Wrong .85 .66 .84 .80 .83 .78 .87 .72 
4. Educated-Ignorant .73 .68 .82 .65 .67 .71 .83 .77 
5. Superior-Inferior .81 .74 .72 .81 .82 .78 .79 .81 
6. High-Low .81 .75 .78 .77 .78 .83 .86 .69 
7. Bene f ic ial-Harmful .88 .82 .84 .76 .84 .82 .80 .74 
8. Good-Bad .90 .67 .84 .80 .85 .79 .85 .82 
9. True-False .85 .72 .81 .83 .82 .79 .84 .68 
10. Wise-Foolish .88 .80 .85 .84 .86 .76 .88 .77 
11. Rewardi ng-Puni tive .67 .64 .62 .57 .58 .58 .84 .73 
12. Important-Inconsequential .41 .62 .26 .55 .60 .74 .63 .75 
13. Safe-Dangerous .81 .66 .80 .81 .85 .77 .76 .68 
14. Original-Oridnary .29 -33 .43 .17 ,10 .12 .46 .49 
15. Harmonious-Dissonant .67 .59 .71 .73 .72 .65 .79 .72 
16. Clean-Dirty .49 .72 .52 .72 .55 .77 .77 .82 
17. Refined-Vulgar .73 .79 .52 .53 .64 .46 .71 .69 
18. Significant-Insignificant .58 .44 .43 .57 .59 .65 .64 .73 
19. Reputable-Disreputable .78 .78 .45 .79 .68 .85 .58 .84 
20. Affectionate-Hateful .62 .72 .63 .74 .58 .77 .74 .49 
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Existentialism Realism 
Concept 2 Concept 8 Concept 9 Concept 10 Concept 3 Concept 7 Concept 11 
E A E A E A E A  E A E A E A  
.61 .65 .75 .76 .79 .66 .63 
00 
.78 .78 .65 .78 .74 .64 
.79 .69 .86 .76 .89 .77 .83 .61 .76 .75 .76 .76 .85 .69 
.71 .51 .84 .76 .86 .81 .84 .75 .82 .76 .74 .76 .82 .65 
.77 .63 .82 .78 .83 .69 .85 .75 .65 .56 .69 .76 .80 .79 
.75 .69 .83 .81 .78 .83 .83 .72 .81 .77 .62 .79 .82 .84 
.71 .75 .77 .83 .82 .65 .77 .74 .71 .76 .58 .73 .51 .60 
.63 .77 .79 .53 .73 .75 .82 .81 .69 .79 .65 .75 .82 .79 
.74 .82 .78 .78 .82 .80 .80 .74 .82 .83 .73 .84 .84 .67 
.73 .72 .79 .77 .86 .88 .85 .73 .76 .70 .76 .79 .85 .71 
.82 .76 .90 .80 .88 .73 .84 .79 .83 .73 .74 .76 .88 .80 
.73 .63 .43 .78 .75 .67 .78 .71 .56 .54 .36 .66 .72 .59 
.66 .56 .83 .80 .69 .87 .86 .76 .41 .62 .73 .79 .71 .78 
.57 .54 .64 .56 .51 .78 .80 .61 .75 .75 .56 .67 .75 .71 
.48 .22 .46 .43 .33 .16 .50 .39 .46 .12 .09 .01 .41 .20 
.60 .68 .72 .71 .64 .47 .80 .20 .56 .64 .68 .74 .69 .67 
.56 .73 .68 .79 .77 .81 .67 .80 .56 .75 .46 .77 .55 .66 
.61 .50 .68 .60 .80 .38 . 65 .64 .56 ,46 .45 .51 .77 .51 
.77 .55 .77 .71 .60 .72 .68 .66 .48 .55 .59 .71 .72 .68 
.39 .72 .39 .76 .70 .72 .74 .77 .65 .69 .48 .78 .66 .77 
.48 .76 .48 .79 .63 .80 .61 .76 .35 .80 .37 .68 .51 .76 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Pragmatism 
Concept 4 Concept 13 .Concept 14 
E A E A E A 
1. Pure-Impure .73 .74 .66 ,64 .67 .70 
2. Positive-Negative .78 .64 .77 .77 .72 .70 
3. Right-Wrong .78 .72 .76 .52 .72 .37 
4. Educated-Ignorant .74 .75 .77 .67 .79 .55 
5. Superior-Inferior .69 .64 .78 .61 .78 .70 
6. High-Low .64 .58 .72 .62 .74 .79 
7. Beneficial-Harmful .75 .75 .82 .72 .77 .66 
8. Good-Bad .70 .80 .80 .64 .80 .73 
9. True-False .81 .63 .75 .63 .77 .74 . 
10. Wise-Foolish .73 .68 .76 .66 .82 .68 
11. Rewarding-Punitive .54 .55 .68 .57 .59 .68 
12. Important-Inconsequential .52 .60 .65 .28 .53 .73 
13. Safe-Dangerous .58 .69 .56 .52 .74 .53 
14. Original-Ordinary .36 .10 .23 .15 .34 .23 
15. Harmonious-Dissonant .72 .63 .64 .51 .60 .52 
16. Clean-Dirty .49 .54 .54 .66 .63 .70 
17. Ref ined-Vulgar .65 .33 .65 .33 .68 .52 
18. Significant-Insignificant .71 .65 .74 .56 .80 .74 
19. Reputable-Disreputable .63 .72 .57 .79 .53 .73 
20. Affectionate-Hateful .45 .70 .43 .62 .54 .63 
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both English and Arabic. These reliabilities exhibited 
little difference between the 20 and the 10 selected scales. 
Responses for each S were averaged across the 10 scales 
selected. The concept scale scores comprised the primary 
dependent variable. An unweighted-means analysis of variance 
which recognized groups (American and Arabs), concepts (with­
in each philosophy) and the associated group X concept inter­
action was performed (Winer, 1971; Blalock, 1972; and Snedecor 
and Cochran, 1967). The group X concept interaction was tested 
for significance. Main effects were of secondary concern. 
Results 
Component factor analysis revealed 10 relatively high 
factor loadings common to all 14 concepts. The loadings 
ranging from 0.53 to 0.99 were for the scales = pure= 
impure, positive-negative, right-wrong, educated-ignorant, 
superior-inferior, high-low, beneficial-harmful, good-bad, 
true-false, wise-foolish. The 20 item SD was, thus, reduced 
to a short, efficient bilingual semantic differential 
instrument, utilizing these 10 qualifiers and meeting objective 
one—to develop a short, efficient bilingual semantic dif­
ferential instrument utilizing qualifiers from the evaluative 
dimension of semantic space to measure philosophical atti­
tudes . 
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Table 6. Means of concepts in each philosophy (10 
qualifiers considered) 
Philosophy Concept English E = 176 
Arabic 
N = 162 Range 
Idealism 
(4 concepts) 
Existentialism 
(4 concepts) 
Realism 
(3 concepts) 
Pragmatism 
(3 concepts) 
1 
5 
6 
12 
2 
8 
9 
10 
3 
7 
11 
4 
13 
14 
3.69 
4.37 
3.52 
3.55 
3.17 
3.52 
3.36 
3.60 
3.85 
3.35 
3.25 
3.15 
3.05 
3.27 
3.40 
4.27 
3.33 
3.49 
2.94 
2.99 
3.34 
3.13 
3.74 
3.52 
2.83 
2.96 
2.89 
2.87 
3.83 3.62 
3.41 3.10 
0.21 
0.31 
3.48 3.36 0.12 
3.16 2.90 0.26 
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The short form also proved to be as dependable as the 
long form. Cronbach coefficient alpha test of reliability 
on the 20 scales across the 14 concepts revealed little 
difference from those estimates obtained by testing the 
scales of the short form. When employing the long instru­
ment, the American Ss exhibited alpha estimates ranging 
between 0.966 and 0.909 with a mean of 0.940. The Arab 
Ss ranged between '>.957 and 0.906 with a mean of 0.934. 
When the short form was used, the American Ss yielded esti­
mates ranging between 0.962 and 0.900 with a mean of 0.939 
while the Arabs showed a wider range between 0.9 36 and 0.833 
with a mean of 0.913. Reliabilities, shown in Table 7, for 
the two types of instruments (long and short) across the two 
samples were considered acceptable reliability levels. The 
previous results, both for factor loadings and reliability 
estimates, fulfilled objective two—to assess the factor 
structure and the reliability of the instrument. 
The following results deal with hypothesis three— 
there are no significant differences between the philosophi­
cal orientations of American and Arab students. As shown 
in Table 8, the analysis of the differential effects among 
concepts for the Arab and American groups revealed a 
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Table 7. Reliability estimates of concept scales : 
A = 20 scales, B = 10 selected scales 
A = 20 scales B = 10 scales 
Philosophy Alpha Estimate Alpha Estimate 
English Arabic English Arabic 
Idealism 1 0.955 0.922 0.961 0.916 
6 0.938 0.948 0.946 0.936 
6 0.948 0.947 0.949 0.936 
12 0.966 0.957 0.962 0.933 
Existentialism 2 0.934 0.932 0.917 0.903 
8 0.953 0.956 0.951 0.929 
9 0.939 0.906 0.956 0.930 
10 0.963 0.950 0.950 0.926 
Realism 3 0.934 0.920 0.933 0.925 
7 0.909 0.949 0.900 0.936 
11 0.957 0.942 0.951 0.913 
Pragmatism 4 0.935 0.928 0.922 0.896 
13 0.939 0.909 0.930 0.875 
14 0.947 0.914 0.930 0.833 
Mean 0.940 0.934 0.939 0.913 
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Table 8. Analysis of variance for philosophies 
Source of 
variation D.P. 
Sum of 
squares 
Mean 
square P-ratio 
IDEALISM 
Among groups 1 7.86 7.86 2.56 
Among people within group 336 1030.80 3.07 -
Among concepts 3 181.36 60.45 49.96** 
Group by concept interaction 3 3.25 1.08 <1 
People by concepts within 
group 1008 1215.89 1.21 -
Total 1351 2439.16 
EXISTENTIALISM 
Among groups 1 33.60 33.60 13.60** 
Among people within group 336 830.85 2.47 -
Among concepts 3 21.01 7.00 7.21** 
Group by concept interaction 3 13.70 4.60 4.74** 
People by concepts within 
group 1008 994.30 0.93 -
Total 1351 1893.46 
** 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Source of 
variation D.F. 
Sum of Mean 
squares Square F-ratio 
REALISM 
Among groups 1 3 .25 3. 25 
Among people within group 336 669 .78 1. 99 
Among concepts 2 95 .19 47. 60 
Group by concept interaction 2 15 .25 7. 62 
1.63 
44.48** 
7.12** 
People by concepts within 
group 672 721 .02 1 .07 -
Total 1013 1504 .49 
PRAGMATISM 
Among groups 1 13 .82 13 .82 5. 95* 
Among people within group 336 779 .77 2 .32 -
Among concepts 2 .90 0 .95 2 = 21 
Group by concept interaction 2 2 .48 1 .24 2. 90 
People by concepts within 
group 672 290 .30 0 .43 
Total 1013 1088 .27 
*Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Significant group x concept interaction for two philoso­
phies: Existentialism [F (3/1000 = 4.74, £ < .011 and 
Realism [F (2/672) = 7.12, p < .001]. Based on the results 
of the F-statistics, the null hypothesis b—there are no 
significant differences between American and Arab students 
in their responses to Existentialism—was rejected. Simi­
larly, null hypothesis c—there are no significant dif­
ferences between American and Arab students in their 
responses to Realism—was rejected from F;-statistic results. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis a—there are no 
significant differences between American and Arab students 
in their responses to Idealism—resulted from the F value 
which was nonsignificant. The F-statistics testing group 
X concept interaction or Pragmatism resulted in a nonsignifi­
cant value. (However, the main effect for groups across the 
concepts describing Pragmatism were significant [F (1/336) 
= 5.95, £ < .05].) Consequently, null hypothesis d— 
there are no significant differences between American and 
Arab students in their responses to Pragmatism was rejected. 
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CHAPTER IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This investigation set out to: (1) develop a short, 
efficient bilingual semantic differential instrument, using 
qualifiers from the evaluative dimension of semantic space 
to measure philosophical attitudes, (2) assess the factor 
structure and the reliability of the instrument, and (3) 
use the instrument in comparing the philosophical orienta­
tions of Arab and American students in higher education. 
This section of the study contains a discussion of findings 
related to these three major problems. It also contains 
a section on philosophical conclusions. 
Assessing Philosophica.1 Attitudes in Short SD Form 
and its Reliability 
The practical purpose of the cross-cultural factor 
analysis is to make it possible to construct for each 
language/culture group a short, efficient SD with factors 
made up of scales having maximal comparability with those 
of the other language/culture group (Osgood, May, and Miron, 
1975, p. 170). Factor loadings reported in Table 5 above 
show that 10 reliable scales common to all concepts 
emerged using principal component factor analysis. Results 
of the Varimax analysis confirmed what Osgood, May, and 
Miron (1975) found for Arab and American samples; that the 
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factors lacked psychological meaning (p. 108). The 
evaluative scale as identified with good-bad displayed 
consistently high factor loadings across concepts in both 
English and Arabic. The major fluctuations among factor 
loadings happened in the remaining 10. scales. The 
linguistic structure of both sets of scales was not 
different except in the frequency of their usage in every­
day conversation. While the short, efficient form consisted 
of adjectival pairs that were popular and familiar to the 
average English speaking student, the rest of the long form 
contained lofty and rather cumbersome adjectives. The first 
set of adjectives had clear-cut connotative significance, 
but the second set contained some adjectives that would be 
difficult to interpret (refined-vulgar; affectionate-
hateful, harmonious-dissonant, important-inconsequential). 
Perhaps the translation was responsible for some dis­
crepancies between the Arabic factor loadings and the 
English ones. It was difficult to get a translation equiva­
lent to rewarding-punitive, vulgar-refined, and original-
ordinary as far as their greatest similarity in usage 
between English and Arabic. The choice of a translation 
equivalent for rewarding as ojf [ ' ] was sound.^ Its 
^Phonetic symbols used in this study followed the style 
reported by Daniel Jones (1964). Exclusive Arabic sounds 
are noted by an asterisk. 
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negative meaning could not be translated by using another 
root like in the case of English punitive, since the word 
that corresponds to it in Arabic is very scientific and 
only used as part of the psychological jargon. The only 
alternative was to use the negative prefix that corresponded 
to "un-r in-, etc." In this case the most common prefix 
was used [ 3*^ ta^ ] . However, the meaning of the word 
differs slightly when the negative prefix is introduced. 
When punitive is used, it carries a stronger connotation 
than only unrewarding which might mean either punitive or 
simply not rewarding. Osgood, May, and Miron (1975) re­
ported that ordinary-unordinary had a very low loading in 
Bengali (-.29). Out of curiosity, the writer checked to 
see if an adjusted pair original-ordinary would yield a low 
factor loading in Arabic. The rationale for this choice 
was that there does not seem to be an Arabic equivalence 
for original. As noted in Table 5, this adjectival pair 
scored the lowest average factor loadings in both Arabic 
and English across concepts. The choice of a translation 
equivalence for original was & ] which means 
literally original but is not a common word to use. Instead, 
the word [ fat.ri:à ] is used to denote a male's first name, 
or if taken as part of standard Arabic, it connotes the 
negative meaning of common. A similar problem was faced 
in dealing with the Arabic adjectival pairs for reputable-
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disreputable. The positive pole of this pair was trans­
lated correctly into [mahmuid] which is used commonly 
as a male's first name. But the essence of the meaning of 
the word in Arabic was introduced as a qualifier for Prophet 
Mohammed whose name is a qualifier. 
The qualifier pair good-bad is considered the most 
significant evaluative scale used by Osgood, Suci, and 
Tannenbaum (1957). Nice-awful consistently loaded highest 
on the evaluative dimension, with good-bad being second or 
third, in the pancultural study reported by Osgood, May, and 
Miron (1975) . This investigation supported the above 
findings. Good-bad exhibited the highest factor loading 
(.90) among concepts and between groups. This .90 value was 
reported for concept 1, Idealism (values are objective, 
permanent and unchanging) by the American Ss. The Arab Ss 
showed .67 at the same level. To emphasize the importance 
of this scale, a discussion on the reliability associated 
with that concept, is in order. The alpha reliability 
estimates for concept 1, Idealism, for the American Ss, using 
the short form, yielded 0.961 compared with 0.916 shown by 
the Arab Ss. Had the good°bad scale been deleted, the 
reliability estimate for the American Ss would have dropped 
to 0.953 compared with a value of 0.910 for the Arab Ss 
under the same condition. This discrepancy in the signifi­
cance of this scale between Arabic and English may be 
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attributed to the fact that the synonyms in Arabic have 
a more social connotation embedded in their meaning than they 
do in English. Bad^ as translated in this investigation 
[radi:], is a strong word that is always substituted with 
milder ones. It may connote moral and ethical corruption. 
The word itself is not as casually used as its synonym in 
English. This particular qualifier and others as well 
facilitated the decision that the short, efficient form of 
SD instrument could be used reliably to assess philosophical 
orientations. 
As reported in the previous chapter and shown in 
Table 7 above, all the alpha reliability estimates for the 
concepts in English and Arabic were at an acceptable level. 
LaVoie and Bentler (1974) measured their success in using 
their short form of SD with the significance of the alpha 
estimates of the concepts used. 
By checking Table 7 for alpha estimates across concepts 
and language/culture groups a conclusion that the 14 con­
cepts used were being measured consistently, and dependably 
was reached. The highest alpha (0.962) was reported by the 
American Ss on concept 12, Idealism (the origin of knowledge 
is in a supernatural source). The Arab Ss revealed 0.933 
alpha on the same concept. The widest difference occurred 
in concept 14, Pragmatism where the Americans yielded 0.930,, 
the Arabs 0.833. In general, this philosophy showed a wider 
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fluctuation in its alpha values between the two groups. 
Based on these results the issue of translation across 
language/culture can be approached. Catford (1965) main­
tained that translation is doomed when there arises either 
difficulty in linguistic and/or cultural context. Lexical 
translation, however, is the poorest of all translation, 
since the word can take up more than one meaning. The 
careful translator, however, can always convey the full 
meaning of the context if he is aware of those differences. 
When the Arabs took the instrument to respond to it, they 
did not know that it was translated from English. Had the 
Arab Ss sensed a translation problem they may not have 
reflected on it as consistently and coherently as the 
reliabilities revealed. That conclusion might be sur­
prising to proponents of the Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis. How­
ever, this study supported the conclusion by Osgood that it 
was possible to translate the instrument from English into 
Arabic and keep as significant results as the Americans 
revealed (Osgood, May, and Miron, 1975) . Whorf (1956) 
did not believe that translating from one language group 
into another was even attainable. The two languages involved 
in this study belong to the Germanic and the Semitic groups. 
The limits of one's language are the limits of one's world. 
If the presupposition that we are all living in one world 
is true, then our language is the same as far as everyday 
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language is concerned (Sefler, 1974) . Language is not a 
prerequisite to thinking. If philosophy is the sum total 
of the cultural doctrines and deep thoughts of the people 
within one culture, the adoption of these thoughts by other 
alien language/culture groups would not be possible. That 
means only the Greek can enjoy and benefit from Plato's 
philosophy. Old Arabia produced Jaber Ibn Hayyan the in­
ventor of algebra as a science. Had it not been for trans­
lation this science might have been unknown in the West. 
Had it not been for translation the Arabs would not have 
treasured Aristotle's works and kept them away from the Church 
in the Dark Ages. 
Translation across language/culture groups is essential 
for civilized man. It is possible even at the highest level 
of sophistication in meaning and structure. Philosophical 
statements are not everyday statements in any language. They 
are mostly confined to educated and well-trained persons. 
In every language, philosophy, like religion or politics, 
has its jargon. Knowing this jargon in two languages helps 
one to translate effectively between them. The study dealt 
with Idealism, Realism, Existentialism, and Pragmatism. 
Except for the laèt philosophy which is considered American, 
the first three are European. The first two were introduced 
in Greek. The third in German and French. The degree of the 
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understanding displayed by the American Ss to those three 
languages should be theoretically equal to the Arabs'. 
Both groups were dealing with translated concepts anyway. 
The American Ss displayed higher reliability estimates when 
concepts in Pragmatism were tested (Pragmatism was introduced 
originally in English). Also, it seems that the American 
students felt more sure of themselves than the Arabs did 
when responding to the scales under this philosophy. Their 
means across concepts were higher than those of the Arab Ss, 
which demonstrated an odd fact. While they exhibited more degree 
of consistency in their responses to Pragmatism, the American 
group tended to favor it less than their Arab counterparts. 
Table 6 shows that the G of the concepts in Pragmatism for 
the American Ss was 3.14 while the Arab G was 2.90. 
Comparison Between the Philosophical Orientations 
of American and Arab Students 
Analysis of variance showed significant results when 
testing the group x concept interaction in two philosophies: 
Existentialism and Realism. Out of the four concepts 
measuring the first philosophy, concept 9 (the basis of 
morality is freedom) showed no large difference between 
the mean scale scores of the two groups (range = 0.02). 
Both American and Arab Ss responded positively to this 
concept, although the Arabs were slightly more positive in 
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their judgement. The rest of the concepts in this philosophy 
2, 8, and 10 (see Table 1) revealed wide differences among 
their means between groups. These ontological statements, 
which deal with self-direction, and choice, were rated 
much more positively by Arab Ss than by American students. 
Interaction effects for the three concepts comprising 
Realism (3, 7, 11) consistently showed differences of mean 
scores between American and Arab Ss (Table 8). This phil­
osophy had the most positive mean score among all the con­
cepts across philosophies. It was displayed by the Arabs 
in concept 11 (obtaining knowledge is essentially a process 
of searching the universe for facts). This may be at­
tributed to the fact that the Arabs (mostly Moslems) had 
religion as an intervening variable in their response to 
that concept. The Koran spelled out explicitly the need 
for each Moslem to search for knowledge everywhere. The 
Islamic tradition reported a hadith (Prophet's saying): 
"Seek knowledge even in China." Bochner (1976) found that 
the religious role was more salient and therefore, less 
differentiated from the self-concept among the Moslems 
than among members of the other groups in his study who were 
Buddists and Christians. 
While the difference is (.17), concept 7, Realism 
(matter is real and concretely exists in its own right 
independently of the mind) is the only one of the 14 rated 
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more positively by the Americans than the Arabs. Analysis 
of the plotted means (Figure 1) not only revealed differences 
across concepts but also within groups. 
Analysis of the differential effects among concepts 
for the two groups showed a nonsignificant group x concept 
interaction for Idealism and Pragmatism. Concept 5 (physical 
objects are ideas in the mind of the perceiver; matter is not 
real) on Idealism revealed the only negative responses 
for both groups. In comparing the mean scores for concepts 
in Idealism and Realism one notices that both groups favored 
them less than they did the other two. It may be because the 
two philosophies are the oldest and the most traditional 
among the four. It may suggest also that both groups are 
tending to favor a more liberal and scientific outlook for 
values and beliefs. 
Analysis of variance on Pragmatism yielded nonsignifi­
cant interaction effects. However, the main effects among 
people within groups was significant [F (1/336) = 5.95, p < 
.05]. The two groups responded in a similar pattern to the 
concepts involved in this philosophy. Both sets of responses 
were positive with the Arab Ss displaying significantly 
more positive responses than American Ss. This was especial­
ly true for concept 14 (Knowledge is found by considering 
the practical consequences of ideas) which had the largest 
difference between the two mean scores. Out of all four 
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Idealism 
Concepts 
12, 
Existentialism 2, 
Concepts 
8 .  
Realism 
Concepts 
Pragmatism 
Concepts 
10 
11, 
13, 
14, 
English 
Arabic 
Figure 1. Mean profiles for the two cultural groups 
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philosophies tested this philosophy was rated most positively 
by both groups as revealed in the over-all grand means (Table 
6 )  .  
Conclusions on Philosophical Comparisons 
The Arab students tended to be more positive than 
Americans on the items relating to choice, freedom, and 
self-determination as in concepts 2, 9, 2, and 10. The 
Americans seemed to be more eclectic in their responses to 
reality as shown in their mean scores on concepts 3, 5, 6, and 
13. 
The findings of this investigation contradict those of 
Naser (1966) who tried to discover and identify differences 
and similarities between educational philosophies of 
prospective American and Arab teachers. The instrument he 
used was a 103-item questionnaire eliciting educational 
philosophical beliefs. The Arab Ss (N = 108) responded in 
Arabic while the Americans (N = 137) in English. The result 
of this study revealed no significant difference (no level of 
significance reported) in the extremity of expression of atti­
tudes between the two groups. The difference between the 
two groups regarding their educational philosophy was found 
significant [t = 4.620, £ < .0012], Naser concluded that 
"teachers are products of their cultures" (p. 124) and are 
expected to be different if they come from different cultures. 
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Except for concept 7, Arab Ss responded more positively 
on all 13 concepts than did Americans. These responses may 
be inflated when one considers the type of sample used. 
The Arab sample may be exhibiting the Halo Effect, since they 
might consider it to be special treatment when residing in a 
foreign country. 
This study realized what John Eaton (1875) speculated 
one hundred years ago when he wrote to a friend: "The 
exchange of ideas with foreigners is an important duty to 
civilization and mankind." Cross-cuitaral research is a 
gold mine for scholars interested in other cultures. The 
world is getting narrower by the increasing number of inven­
tions of communication techniques. 
Philosophy is a major aspect in every culture. It 
reflects the modes of the groups in respect to their think­
ing, behavior, and even their aspirations. Cross-cultural 
communication and agreement on similar, identified sets of 
values and beliefs are worth researching for their useful­
ness in solving potential conflicts. 
The similarities revealed by this investigation between 
the philosophical orientations of the two culture groups 
point out the great hope for better and mutual under­
standing between the East and the West. It also points out 
the need for more empirical research in this area. 
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUMENT IN ENGLISH 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
On each of the following pages there is a statement representing one of four 
philosophical categories (idealism, realism, pragmatism, existentialism). 
Please read each statement carefully and then respond by circling the point on 
each adjectival scale which best represents your feelings about that state­
ment. Respond in terms of your own interpretation of what each statement 
means. There are no right or wrong answers. Please respond on every scale. 
If a particular adjectival pair seems not to apply, circle a center position. 
Example: 
God is real. 
Bad Good 
If you feel the statement "God is real" is a completely "bad" statement, you 
would circle ^e point closest to the word "bad". 
Bad (T) Good 
If you feel it is canpletely "good" you would circle the point closest to the 
word "good". 
Bad (D Good 
If your feelings are mixed or if you feel naîtrai about this statement, you 
would circle an appropriate intermediate point. 
Bad 0 . . . Good 
Please do not record your name, social security number or other information v.'hich 
might iHehtify you. Please do indicate the following background information: 
Sex: Male Female (Circle appropriate response) 
Have you studied philosophy either in courses or on your own to the extent that 
you feel you understand generally what is implied by the terms "idealism", "realism", 
"pragmatism" and "existentialism"? 
Yes No (Circle appropriate response) 
Note: Your responses are equally valuable whether you have or have not studied 
philosophy. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE. 
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Values are objective, permanent and 
unchanging. 
11. Rewarding 
12. Pure 
13. Positive 
14. Inconsequential 
15. Safe 
16. Wrong 
17. Ignorant 
18. Original 
19. Dissonant 
20. Clean 
21. Superior 
22. Affectionate 
23. High 
24. Beneficial 
25. Vulgar 
26. Bad 
27, Insignificant 
28. True 
29. Foolish 
30. Disreputable 
Punitive 
Impure 
Negative 
Important 
Dangerotis 
Right 
Educated 
Ordinary 
Harmonious 
Dirty 
Inferior 
Hateful 
Low 
Harmful 
Refined 
Good 
Significant 
False 
Wise 
Reputable 
2 
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The authentic life is one of 
self-determination within a 
specific time and place. 
31. Hateful 
32. Significant 
33. Dirty 
34. True 
35. Ordinary 
36. Bad 
37. Positive 
38. Harmful 
39. Punitive 
40. Low 
41. Safe 
42. Superior 
43. Wise 
44. Dissonant 
45. Important 
46. Educated 
47. Vulgar 
48. Pure 
49. Reputable 
50. Right 
Affectionate 
Insignificant 
Clean 
False 
Original 
Good 
Negative 
Beneficial 
Rewarding 
High 
Dangerous 
Inferior 
Foolish 
Harmonious 
Inconsequential 
Ignorant 
Refined 
Impure 
Disreputable 
Wrong 
3 
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Reality originates in the material 
and physical world. 
51. Safe 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
Dirty 
True 
Foolish 
Hateful 
56. Punitive 
57. Good 
58. Inferior 
59. Impure 
60. Wrong 
61. High 
62. Important 
63. Original 
64. Harmful 
65. Harmonious 
66. Vulgar 
67. Positive 
68. Reputable 
69. Ignorant 
70. Significant 
Dangerous 
Clean 
False 
Wise 
Affectionate 
Rewarding 
Bad 
Superior 
Pure 
Right 
Low 
Inconsequentia1 
Ordinary 
Beneficial 
Dissonant 
Refined 
Negative 
Disreputable 
Educated 
Insignificant 
4 
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The test of a theory, belief or 
doctrine must be its effect upon 
us, its practical consequences. 
71. Negative 
72. Dissmant 
73. Affectionate 
74. Harmful 
75. Inç)ortant 
76. Significant 
77. Rewarding 
78. 
79. 
80. 
11. 
Ignorant 
Dirty 
High 
Refined 
12. True 
13. Dangerous 
14. Impure 
15. Original 
16. Superior 
17. Disreputable 
18• Bad 
19. Wise 
20. Wrong 
Positive 
Harmonious 
Hateful 
Beneficial 
Inconsequential 
Insignificant 
Punitive 
Educated 
Clean 
Low 
Vulgar 
False 
Safe 
Pure 
Ordinary 
Inferior 
Reputable 
Good 
Foolish 
Right 
5 
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Physical objects are ideas in the 
mind o£ the perceiver; matter is 
not real. 
21. Beneficial 
22. Superior 
23. Harmonious 
24. Inç)ure 
25. False 
26. Positive 
27. Low 
28. Affectionate 
29. Ignorant 
30. Original 
31. Bad 
32. Safe 
33. Dirty 
34. Vulgar 
35. Right 
36. Foolish 
37. Reputable 
38. Important 
39. Punitive 
40. Significant 
Harmful 
Inferior 
Dissonant 
Pure 
True 
Negative 
High 
Hateful 
Educated 
Ordinary 
Good 
Dangerous 
Clean 
Refined 
Wrong 
Wise 
Disreputable 
Inconsequential 
Rewarding 
Insignificant 
6 
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Reality is spiritual or mental 
in nature. 
41. Good 
42. Beneficial 
43. Dangerous 
44. Inferior 
45. Dissonant 
46. Dirty 
47. Pure 
48. Vulgar 
49. True 
50. Right 
51. Negative 
52. Foolish 
53. High 
54. Reputable 
55. Affectionate 
56. Important 
57. Ignorant 
58. Rewarding 
59. Ordinary 
60. Significant 
Bad 
Harmful 
Safe 
Superior 
Harmonious 
Clean 
Impure 
Refined 
False 
Wrong 
Positive 
Wise 
Low 
Disreputable 
Hateful 
Inconsequential 
Educated 
Punitive 
Original 
Insignificant 
61. Wise 
62. Superior 
63. IncOTisequential 
64. Refined 
65. Ins ignif icant 
66. Hateful 
67. Impure 
68. Ordinary 
69. Negative 
70. Safe 
71. Rewarding 
72. High 
73. Dissonant 
74. Educated. 
75. Dirty 
76. Right 
77. Reputable 
78. True 
79. Bad 
80. Harmful 
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Matter is real and concretely exists 
in its own right independently of 
the mind. 
Foolish 
Inferior 
Important 
Vulgar 
Significant 
Affectionate 
Pure 
Original 
Positive 
Dangerous 
Punitive 
Low 
Harmonious 
Ignorant 
Clean 
Wrong 
Disreputable 
False 
Good 
Beneficial 
8 
94 
The essence of reality is choice. 
11. Superior 
12. Low 
13. Wise 
14. Dissonant 
15. Important 
16. Educated 
17. Refined 
18. Clean 
19. Significant 
20. Wrong 
21. Hateful 
22. Reputable 
23. Pure 
24. True 
25. Original 
26. Bad 
27. Positive 
28. Beneficial 
29. Dangerous 
30. Rewarding 
Inferior 
High 
Foolish 
Harmonious 
Inconsequential 
Ignorant 
Vulgar 
Dirty 
Insignificant 
Right 
Affectionate 
Disreputable 
Impure 
False 
Ordinary 
Good 
Nega tive 
Harmful 
Safe 
Punitive 
9 
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The basis of morality is freedom. 
31. Bad 
32. Beneficial 
33. Dangerous 
34. Inferior 
35. Harmonious 
36. Dirty 
37. Pure 
38. Refined 
39. False 
40. Wrong 
41. Negative 
42. Wise 
43. High 
44. Disreputable 
45. Hateful 
46. Inconsequential 
47. Educated 
48. Rewarding 
49. Original 
50. Insignificant 
Good 
Harmful 
Safe 
Superior 
Dissonant 
Clean 
Impure 
Vulgar 
True 
Right 
Positive 
Foolish 
Low 
Reputable 
Affectionate 
Important 
Ignorant 
Punitive 
Ordinary 
Significant 
10 
Reality is determined when man chooses 
either to confront or avoid a situation, 
make or refuse to make a commitment. 
51. Good 
52. Dirty 
53. Positive 
54. Inconsequential 
55. Harmful 
56. Pure 
57. Foolish 
58. Ignorant 
59. Safe 
60. Vulgar 
61. High 
62. Punitive 
63. Superior 
64. True 
65. Disreputable 
66. Original 
67. Harmonious 
68. Right 
69. Hateful 
70. Insignificant 
Bad 
Clean 
Negative 
Important 
Useful 
Impure 
Wise 
Educated 
Dangerous 
Refined 
Low 
Rewarding 
Inferior 
False 
Reputable 
Ordinary 
Dissonant 
Wrong 
Affectionate 
Significant 
Obtaining knowledge is essentially 
a process of searching the universe 
for facts. 
71. Insignificant 
72. Harmful 
73. Inferior 
74. Clean 
75. Vulgar 
76. Right 
77. Foolish 
78. Disreputable 
79. Inconsequential 
80. Rewarding 
11. Hateful 
12. True 
13. Dangerous 
14. Ignorant 
15. Positive 
16. Dissonant 
17. Ordinary 
18. High 
19. Pure 
20. Good 
Significant 
Useful 
Superior 
Dirty 
Ref ined 
Wrong 
Wise 
Reputable 
Important 
Punitive 
Affectionate 
False 
Safe 
Educated 
Negative 
Harmonious 
Original 
Low 
Impure 
Bad 
12 
98 
The origin of knowledge is in 
a supernatural source. 
21. Bad 
22. Impure 
23. High 
24. Ordinary 
25. Dissonant 
26. Negative 
27. Ignorant 
28. Dangerous 
29. True 
30. Affectionate 
31. Punitive 
32. Important 
33. Disreputable 
34. Foolish 
35. Right 
36. Vulgar 
37. Dirty 
38. Inferior 
39. Useful 
40. Insignificant 
Good 
Pure 
Low 
Original 
Harmonious 
Positive 
Educated 
Safe 
False 
Hateful 
Rewarding 
Inconsequential 
Reputable 
Wise 
Wrong 
Refined 
Clean 
Superior 
Harmful 
Significant 
13 
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Experiences constitute reality 
and govern responses to problems. 
41. Pure 
42. Vulgar 
43. Hateful 
44. Harmful 
45. True 
46. Inconsequential 
47. Safe 
48. Right 
49. Ignorant 
50. Superior 
51. Negative 
52. Rewarding 
53. Dissonant 
54. Wise 
55. Ordinary 
56. Clean 
57. High 
58. Insignificant 
59. Good 
60. Disreputable 
Impure 
Ref ined 
Affectionate 
Useful 
False 
Important 
Dangerous 
Wrong 
Educated 
Inferior 
Positive 
Punitive 
Harmonious 
Foolish 
Original 
Dirty 
Low 
Significant 
Bad 
Reputable 
14 
61. Significant 
62. Rewarding 
63. Important 
64. Disreputable 
65. Wise 
66. Wrong 
67. Refined 
68. Clean 
69. Superior 
70. Useful 
71. Ordinary 
12. Educated 
73. Hateful 
74. High 
75. Negative 
76. True 
77. Impure 
78. Dissonant 
79. Safe 
80. Good 
Knowledge is foun<?^by considering 
the practical consequences of ideas. 
Insignificant 
Punitive 
Inconsequential 
Reputable 
Foolish 
Right 
Vulgar 
Dirty 
Inferior 
Harmful 
Original 
Ignorant 
Affectionate 
Low 
Positive 
False 
Pure 
Harmonious 
Dangerous 
Bad 
15 
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APPENDIX B; INSTRUMENT IN ARABIC 
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APPENDIX C: FACTOR LOADINGS (VARIMAX) 
Table Al. Factor Loadings (Varimax) 
Qualifiers 
(scales) 
Idealism 
Concept 1 
E A 
Concept 5 Concept 6 
E A E A 
Concept 12 
E A 
1. Pure-Impure .66 .60 
2. Positive-Negative .75 .54 
3. Right-Wrong .85 .38 
4. Educated-Ignorant .68 .19 
5. Superior-Inferior .60 .49 
6. High-Low .68 .38 
7. Beneficial-Harmful .75 .66 
8. Good-Bad .82 .49 
9. True-False .82 ,62 
10. Wise-Foolish .80 .39 
11. Rewarding-Punitive .61 .38 
12. Important-Inconsequential .15 .57 
13. Safe-Dangerous .74 .50 
14. Original-Ordinary .30 .06 
15. Harmonious-Dissonant .59 .18 
16. Clean-Dirty .13 .55 
17. Refined-Vulgar .46 .06 
18. Significant-Insignificant .33 .47 
19. Reputable-Disreputable ,54 .49 
20. Affectionate-Hateful .29 .62 
.67 .73 .64 .30 
.86 .34 .79 .43 
.82 .43 .80 .29 
.54 .65 .40 .54 
.75 .43 .70 .75 
.55 .68 .77 .46 
.60 .45 .74 
.86 .73 .83 
36 
.64 .81 .78 .35 
.40 
.68 .78 .45 .64 
.36 .60 .34 .35 
.05 .28 .17 .26 
.54 .41 .66 .71 
.37 .04 .10 .00 
.53 .40 .57 .68 
.11 .78 .52 .78 
.22 ,57 .48 .39 
.18 ,24 .29 .20 
.08 .42 .46 .38 
.38 .46 ,55 ,35 
.56 .76 
.57 .73 
.71 .28 
.60 .79 
.44 .72 
.58 .39 
.71 .40 
.66 .67 
.74 .28 
.68 .66 
.51 .64 
.22 ,36 
,67 ,68 
.11 .54 
.42 ,68 
.40 .69 
.30 •.72 
.29 .68 
.61 .76 
.44 .13 
119 
Existentialism Pragmatism 
Concept 2 Concept 8 Concept 9 Concept 10 Concept 4 Concept 13 Concept 14 
E A E A E A E A E A E A E A 
.42 .47 .66 .63 .44 .30 .77 .34 
.61 .55 .55 .32 .56 .72 .59 .21 
.62 .29 .70 .16 .45 .74 .71 .41 
.65 .52 .27 .65 .33 .26 .42 .72 
.61 .62 .79 .70 .49 .70 .42 .36 
.57 .28 .55 .57 ,38 .28 ,48 .26 
.57 .50 .50 .33 .55 .46 .59 .73 
.64 .44 .58 .21 .45 .82 .60 ,33 
.67 .55 .72 .40 .52 .80 .51 ,39 
.85 .60 .74 .67 .44 .43 .49 .80 
.65 .18 .04 .61 .61 .26 .46 .73 
.64 .12 .44 .37 .04 .88 .56 .73 
.49 .65 .70 .38 .65 .57 .66 .25 
.35 .02 .25 .22 .12 .00 .13 .02 
.40 .46 .54 .49 .63 .17 .71 .24 
,20 .41 .46 .61 .39 .19 .50 .65 
.34 .05 .22 .56 .27 .25 .26 .49 
.57 .25 .40 .22 .13 .66 .16 .67 
.16 .75 .30 .57 .60 .64 .47 .74 
.13 .39 .34 .34 .42 .70 .13 .72 
.45 .75 .19 .36 .46 .11 
.63 .37 .39 .45 .67 .32 
.75 .72 .31 .77 .79 .40 
.35 .60 .36 .67 .66 .66 
.46 .77 .09 .63 .70 .78 
.62 .33 .27 .70 .38 .17 
.57 .75 .17 .53 .78 .79 
.79 .46 .35 .63 .79 .23 
.79 .32 .18 .74 .79 .25 
.77 .66 .15 .61 .81 .71 
.33 .21 .50 .48 .61 .11 
.18 .20 .68 .35 .46 .77 
.34 .32 .32 .69 .61 .50 
.16 .04 .03 .02 .16 .36 
.48 .27 .30 .55 .52 .57 
.40 .70 .03 .31 .20 .31 
.46 .46 .02 .40 .51 .40 
.18 .30 .94 .31 .63 .68 
.23 .32 .17 .83 .29 .68 
.19 .66 .06 .23 .17 .66 
120 
Table Al (Continued) 
Qualifiers 
(Scales) 
Pragmatism 
Concept 4 Concept 13 Concept 14 
E A E A E A 
1. Pure-Impure .58 .72 .58 .26 .16 .67 
2. Positive-Negative .20 .20 .41 .80 .29 .72 
3. Right-Wrong .25 .29 .14 .50 .64 .13 
4. Educated-Ignorant .53 .43 .57 .55 .68 .14 
5. Superior-Inferior .57 .32 .47 .23 .51 .06 
6. High-Low .52 .25 . 66 .12 .26 .31 
7. Bene f ic ia1-Harmful .30 .23 .24 .70 .63 .23 
8. Good-Bad .31 .52 .35 .39 .34 .29 
9. True-False .47 .14 .26 .60 .77 .31 
10. Wise-Foolish >26 .38 .34 .36 .64 .16 
11. Rewarding-Punitive .00 .14 .44 .24 .17 .06 
12 « Important-Inconsequential .06 .14 .16 .93 .54 .28 
13. Safe-Dangerous .12 .76 .32 .06 .39 .05 
14. Original-Ordinary .26 .07 .03 .00 .42 .29 
15. Harmonious-Dissonant .15 .11 .22 .39 .34 .48 
16. Clean-Dirty .68 .50 .66 .31 .27 .15 
17. Refined-Vulgar .69 .50 .17 .18 .12 .22 
18. Significant-Ins ignificant .33 .19 .35 .63 .33 .35 
19. Reputable-Disreputable .44 .69 .47 .67 .33 .64 
20. Affectionate-Hateful .42 .41 .20 .51 .00 .68 
